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YOU SAY YES, I SAY NO: INSULATING THE INITIATIVE POWER
AGAINST LEGISLATIVE TAMPERING IN VOTING AND ELECTORAL
REFORMS
Louis C. Dodge Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Elections are often hailed as reflecting “the will of the people,” with
legislators claiming broad mandates to implement their legislative
agendas. But what happens when the electorate’s legislative power
comes into conflict with the legislature’s legislative power? More
specifically, what happens when the peoples’ attempted reforms
concern the electoral process itself, and the people’s representatives
fight back?
Consider, for instance, the plight of a Floridian who cast a ballot in
support of Amendment 4 in 2018. Amendment 4 was a ballot initiative
which, if approved, would amend the state constitution to restore voting
rights to individuals convicted of a felony, excluding murderers and sex
offenders, who have “complete[d] their sentence[s].”1 The campaign for
Amendment 4 succeeded, with 64.5% of Florida voters casting their
ballots in favor of restoring the franchise to individuals with felony
convictions.2 Mere months later, however, the Republican-controlled
Florida legislature passed a new law, S.B. 7066, which provided that an
individual with a felony conviction would not be characterized as having
“complet[ed] all terms of [a] sentence” until that person had repaid in
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1 FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2020); FLA. DEPT. OF STATE DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, NOV. 6,
2018 GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL RESULTS, https://results.elections.myflorida.com/
index.asp?electiondate=11/6/2018&datamode= (select “Const. Amendments” under
the “Select Office” dropdown menu).
2 Id.

1317

DODGE (DO NOT DELETE)

1318

4/8/2021 10:57 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1317

full all legal fines and fees flowing from that sentence.3 This statutory
enactment effectively made voting rights restoration all but impossible
for many, as the Florida Clerk of Courts association acknowledges that
more than 80% of legal financial obligations have “minimal collections
expectations.”4
In the midst of a constitutional challenge to S.B. 7066, the Governor
of Florida requested an Advisory Opinion from the Florida Supreme
Court regarding Amendment 4, asking “whether the phrase ‘all terms of
sentence’ encompasses . . . fines, restitution, costs, and fees [] ordered
by the sentencing court.”5 The court answered in the affirmative,
holding that “[t]he language at issue, read in context, has an
unambiguous ordinary meaning that voters would most likely
understand to encompass obligations including LFOs.”6 The court’s
decision arguably goes beyond its precedents to determine the intent of
the legislation and mandates, rather than allows, repayment of legal
financial obligations before becoming eligible for voting rights
restoration. The effect of the legislature’s interpretation of the
amendment is clear, particularly in light of a recent federal court
decision holding that Amendment 4, as interpreted by the Florida state
legislature and Supreme Court, does not violate the federal
Constitution.7 The legislature could have clarified the “all terms of
sentence” language to further the electorate’s goal of restoring voting
rights to thousands of individuals with a felony conviction. Instead, the
legislature undermined the will of the electorate, as demonstrated
through the constitutional initiative, was undermined by deciding to
interpret the provision, not defined in the initiative itself, in such a
strictly textualist manner.8

3

FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2020).
See Daniel Rivero, Felons Might Have to Pay Hundreds of Millions Before Being Able
to Vote in Florida, WLRN PUB. RADIO & TELEVISION (Jan. 20, 2019, 7:38 PM),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/felons-might-have-pay-hundreds-millions-being-ablevote-florida. Annual collection rates vary widely, “from 83 percent in 2015 down to as
low as 43 percent in 2013.” Matthew Menendez, Michael F. Crowley, Lauren-Brooke
Eisen & Noah Atchison, The Steep Costs of Criminal Justice Fines and Fees, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. 45 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/
2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final.pdf; see also Meghan Keneally, “It’s Not America: 11
Million Go Without a License Because of Unpaid Fines, ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/vicious-cycle-11-million-live-drivers-license-unpaid/
story?id=66504966.
5 Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting
Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 2020).
6 Id. at 1078 (internal quotations omitted).
7 See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020).
8 FLA. DEPT. OF STATE DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, supra note 1.
4
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This dynamic has manifested itself several times with respect to
voting and electoral laws passed by ballot initiative. In South Dakota,
legislators repealed an initiated campaign finance statute.9 In Idaho,
despite voter approval of three initiatives on the issue of term limits for
state and local officials over six years, legislators repealed the measures
that would have prevented them from seeking reelection.10 Florida,
South Dakota, and Idaho all illustrate that when faced with new electoral
or voting laws passed directly by the electorate, legislatures have
chosen to amend, repeal, or effectively nullify those initiatives’ results.
Certainly, there may be justifications for these responses to
legislation-by-initiative; for example, an extensive body of literature
documents the downsides of voter initiatives and the risks they pose for
minority groups.11 When given the unfettered opportunity to do so,
majority groups have shaped (and likely will continue to shape)
electoral laws to maximize their own powers.12 But the lesser-known
problem is that of majorities—and even supermajorities—of voters
conferring new rights and more substantial access to the ballot box
through ballot initiatives, only to see those reforms rolled back or
altogether repealed by a majority of elected representatives. These
dynamics create comparably significant barriers to vulnerable groups’
abilities to exercise their political power. Just as scholars caution that
states should safeguard minorities against tyranny of the majority at
large,13 states should equally protect minorities from a handful of
powerful individuals who choose to defy the will of the people by rolling
back expansions of the franchise, campaign finance reforms, term limits,
and other laws which directly affect how legislators are chosen.
9

See discussion infra Section II.0.
See discussion infra Section II.0.
11 See, e.g., Kristen Barnes, Breaking the Cycle: Countering Voter Initiatives and the
Underrepresentation of Racial Minorities in the Political Process, 12 DUKE F. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 123, 125 (2017); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1978); Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and
Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1730, 1745 (2013); Julian N. Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1557–58 (1990); Cynthia L. Fountaine,
Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating
by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 (1988).
12 For example, following the 2010 census, a number of state political parties took
advantage of their controlling both the legislative and executive branches of government
in their respective states to draw legislative and congressional district lines that helped
to entrench their majorities for the coming decade and make it more difficult for the
minority party to be competitive. Alex Tausanovitch, The Impact of Partisan
Gerrymandering, CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 1, 2019, 9:01 AM), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/democracy/news/2019/10/01/475166/impact-partisangerrymandering.
13 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 11.
10
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Initiatives have become a useful tool for voters to push back against
unresponsive legislatures in an era of highly partisan politics,
particularly in the realm of voting rights and electoral reforms. This
Comment proposes that, because a higher degree of democratic
participation facilitates a more inclusive and democratic society,
legislatures must be limited in their ability to amend or repeal initiated
statutes. In this way, initiatives can serve as a tool to expand the
franchise and facilitate democratic accountability in an era where nearly
unfettered campaign finance has reduced legislators’ responsiveness to
their respective constituents’ will.
This Comment will examine how state legislatures across the
United States have pushed back on—and in some cases,
nullified—voting and electoral initiatives passed by large majorities of
the voting population.14 Unlike the federal Constitution,15 many state
constitutions create mechanisms for citizens to directly propose and
force a popular vote on binding legislation or constitutional
amendments; indeed, a majority of states allow citizens to initiate
legislation themselves or veto legislation through a referendum.16 The
14 This Comment focuses on state legislatures, but it would be irresponsible not to
point out the similar dynamics at play following the 2020 U.S. Presidential election.
Though the Trump campaign’s efforts to reverse the results of an election that he lost
the popular vote by over six million votes ultimately proved unsuccessful, Presidential
Election Results: Biden Wins, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
11/03/us/elections/results-president.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2020), the antidemocratic institutional consequences of the (now former) President’s campaign to
undermine the election results will surely endure, see Jim Rutenberg & Nick Corasaniti,
‘An Indelible Stain’: How the G.O.P Tried to Topple a Pillar of Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/12/us/politics/trump-lawsuitselectoral-college.html. At the heart of these efforts was the same desire to override the
popular will—the election of President Biden—through a concerted effort to lobby state
legislators to elect a Republican slate of electors. See Clara Hendrickson, Donald Trump
Called Monica Palmer After Wayne County Board of Canvassers Meeting, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (Nov. 19, 2020, 7:35 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/
detroit/2020/11/19/trump-monica-palmer-wayne-canvassers-certification-election/
3776190001; Ed White et al., Trump Summons Michigan GOP Leaders for Extraordinary
Meeting, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 19, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/trump-invitesmichigan-gop-white-house-6ab95edd3373ecc9607381175d6f3328. As this Comment
demonstrates, that state legislators and election officials chose to act according to the
popular will in this instance more likely reflects the immense public pressure and
publicity surrounding election certification in one of the most contentious election
cycles in history than it does those officials’ commitment to upholding basic democratic
principles. Only time will tell what consequences this high-profile effort to reject the
popular will might have on elections and ballot initiatives moving forward, but that issue
is largely beyond the scope of this paper.
15 Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1079–87 (1988).
16 Initiative and Referendum Processes, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec.
31, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-and-
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federal Constitution has left these states with significant leeway to
allocate their legislative powers in different ways, and many states have
chosen to vest some degree of power to propose and enact legislation
directly in the electorate.17 In Part II, this Comment looks first at three
instances of legislative “nullification”—cases in which the legislature
repealed or amended a piece of initiated legislation in a manner that
changed its effects and achieved a result that was counter to the
expressed will of the electorate. Part III examines why today’s political
climate necessitates state constitutional amendments that insulate the
initiative power with respect to voting and electoral reforms while
expanding judicial review. Part IV analyzes existing models for these
types of constraints, looking particularly at constitutional restraints in
Arizona and California on the legislature’s ability to repeal or amend
enacted initiatives. Finally, Part V proposes a remedial amendment to
state constitutions and examines counterarguments to that proposal.
II. LEGISLATIVE RESISTANCE TO VOTING AND ELECTORAL REFORMS THROUGH
BALLOT INITIATIVES
It is important to distinguish an initiative from a referendum at the
outset; in common parlance, these phrases are often conflated. An
initiative is “[a]n electoral process by which a percentage of voters can
propose legislation and compel a vote on it . . .” by the electorate itself.18
In contrast, a referendum is “[t]he process of referring a state legislative
act, a state constitutional amendment, or an important public issue to
the people for final approval by popular vote,” or a vote taken pursuant
to such a legislative referral.19 This Comment focuses on what some
scholars have called “substitute” direct democracy rather than
“complementary” direct democracy.20 Through “substitute” direct
democracy, the people assume the power of legislators and circumvent
the formal legislative and executive branches to propose, and
potentially enact, their chosen policies.21 In contrast, “complementary”
direct democracy entails legislative referral of legislation to the
electorate for approval.22 This discussion excludes from consideration
“indirect” initiatives, which submit the proposed legislation to

referendum-processes.aspx; Laws Governing Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Laws_governing_ballot_measures (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
17 See discussion infra Part 0.
18 Initiative, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).
19 Referendum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
20 Eule, supra note 11, at 1510.
21 See id.
22 Id. at 1512.
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legislators before being placed on the ballot for popular approval.23
Because both indirect initiatives and referenda require legislative
consideration prior to being put before the electorate, they are less
relevant to this discussion. This Comment also considers constitutional
amendments passed by way of initiative. Though different in terms of
how they bind the legislature, the process by which these amendments
are passed face similar dynamics, which have produced legislative
responses akin to those of initiated statutes and thus warrant
consideration.24
South Dakota, Idaho, and Florida present three cases where
similar—yet procedurally distinct—dynamics resulted in the effective
nullification of voter-approved ballot initiatives. These episodes
demonstrate three approaches for legislatures to defy even the most
broadly supported voter initiatives by choosing either to repeal the law
or implement it based on legislators’ own self-interest. There are other
instances of these dynamics at work,25 including instances outside the
scope of this Comment, where legislatures have pushed back in a similar
way against reforms unrelated to elections or voting laws. Ultimately,
the three states discussed herein present a diverse array of issues and
procedures that arise when the electorate’s legislative power comes
into conflict with the legislature’s legislative power.

23

Id. at 1511.
For example, in Florida, which allows initiatives to amend the constitution but not
to pass ordinary legislation, the initiative must be filed with the Secretary of State’s
office, a petition in favor of the initiative must be signed by voters in each congressional
district equal to eight percent of the votes cast in the last preceding election, and the
initiative must be approved by 60% of voters. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e). In comparison,
South Dakota requires sponsors of an initiated statute to file a copy of the proposed
statute with the Secretary of State prior to collecting signatures, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1.2 (2020), and then requires signatures of five percent of the number of votes in the
previous gubernatorial election, S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1. Ordinary initiatives in South
Dakota require only a majority vote for approval. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-1-12 (2020).
25 See infra Table 1.
24
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A. Ethics and Campaign Finance Reform in South Dakota
In South Dakota, the people’s power to initiate laws on any subject
is coextensive with the legislature’s authority to propose measures.26
This power does not limit the legislature’s ability to amend or repeal any
law passed by initiative.27 South Dakota voters chose to exercise their
power in 2016 when they approved Measure 22, which was designed to
lower maximum contribution amounts to Political Action Committees
(PACs), political parties, and candidates; create a voluntary, publicly
funded campaign finance program for statewide and legislative
candidates; create an appointed ethics commission to administer the
public financing system and enforce campaign finance laws; and
prohibit certain state officials from lobbying after leaving government.28
Voters approved Measure 22 by a three-point margin, voting 51.6% to
48.4% in favor.29

26 Brendtro v. Nelson, 720 N.W.2d 670, 680 (S.D. 2006) (discussing the people’s
power to repeal or amend laws passed by the state legislature). The state constitution
vests legislative power in the state legislature but reserves to the people “the right to
propose measures, which shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state . . .
except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public
institutions.” S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1. For further discussion on South Dakota’s initiative
power, see Jessica A. Levinson, Taking the Initiative: How to Save Direct Democracy, 18
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1019, 1023 (2014); Nicholas R. Theodore, Note, We the People: A
Needed Reform of State Initiative and Referendum Procedures, 78 MO. L. REV. 1401, 1404
(2013); State Initiative and Referendum, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. (2014),
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states/state.cfm?id=24.
27 Brendtro, 720 N.W.2d at 682 (quoting State ex rel. Richards v. Whisman, 154 N.W.
707, 709 (S.D. 1915)). Courts have further held that the lack of any explicit limitation
on the legislature’s ability to amend, veto, or nullify ballot initiatives indicates the
legislature’s power to do so. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the Executive
power to veto is barred, demonstrating that the framers of the 1898 amendment gave
consideration to which branches of the state government should be able to amend such
initiatives. Whisman, 154 N.W. at 709–10 (comparing the South Dakota constitution to
state constitutions which have expressly limited legislative power to repeal and/or
amend initiated measures.). South Dakota is one of eleven states with no restrictions on
the legislature’s ability to amend or repeal initiatives. Limiting the Legislature’s Power
to Amend and Repeal Initiated Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATES LEGISLATURES (June 28, 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/limits-on-legislativepower.aspx; see also Legislative Alteration, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Legislative_alteration#States_with_no_restrictions (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
28 ATTORNEY GENERAL EXPLANATION, INITIATED MEASURE 22, 2016 STATEWIDE BALLOT
MEASURES, S.D. SEC’Y OF ST., https://sdsos.gov/elections-voting/assets/2016FullTextof
theBallotQuestionProposals.pdf.
29 South Dakota Measure 22—Revise Campaign Finance and Lobbying Laws—Results:
Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/
2016/results/south-dakota-ballot-measure-22-campaign-finance-overhaul. South
Dakota requires a simple majority in order for initiatives to be enacted into law. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 2-1-12 (2020).
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On February 2, 2017, the Governor of South Dakota signed into law
H.B. 1069, which repealed key sections of Measure 22 and amended
others to dramatically limit the effect that the initiative could have on
campaign finance in South Dakota.30 The text of H.B. 1069 provided that,
because it was “necessary for the support of the state government and
its existing institutions, an emergency [was] declared to exist.”31
Through the use of the “legislative emergency” clause, the South Dakota
legislature made it impossible for the repeal bill to be called for a
referendum.32 The State Senate voted 27 to 8 in favor of repeal.33
Supporters of the repeal effort argued that “Measure 22 was
constitutionally murky and should be repealed and replaced with pieces
that more clearly reflect the will of the voters.”34 But not everyone
supported the bill. Sen. Billie Sutton (D-Burke) stated before the
passage of the repeal bill that it would “send[] the message that we do
not trust [the people] to make decisions on ballot measures. . . . The
bottom line is will we ignore the will of the people?”35
Despite pledging to replace Measure 22 with new legislation that
would resolve the alleged constitutional issues while still honoring “the
will of the people,” the South Dakota legislature largely failed to restore
the policies promised by Measure 22. Through repeal, South Dakota
lawmakers were effectively able to choose elements of the bill to
implement and others to eliminate, in conflict with the expressed will of
the voters through the election results. The legislature restored
campaign finance contributions to substantially higher pre-Measure 22
levels, declined to enact the public financing system, and narrowly

30 H.B. 1069, 2017 Leg., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017) (codified as Campaign Finance Repeal
and Revise, 2017 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 72 §§ 1–2 185).
31 Id.
32 For a discussion of the lawful functions of the emergency clause under South
Dakota law, see Whisman, 154 N.W. at 711–12 (“The only lawful function of the
emergency clause is to cause an enactment to go into effect as soon as signed by the
executive, instead of waiting until the first day of the next July. It must be observed that
the initiative and referendum amendment to the Constitution provides that any laws
which the Legislature may have enacted shall, upon a proper referendum petition being
filed, be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect, except
such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health, or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions.”).
33 Dana Ferguson, S.D. Senate Strikes Voter-Approved Ethics Law, ARGUS LEADER (Feb.
1, 2017, 7:59 PM), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/01/
sd-senate-strikes-voter-approved-ethics-law/97333962.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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defined other portions of the remaining provisions to limit their
application.36
In 2018, voters put an initiated constitutional amendment on the
ballot that would have restored the proposed campaign finance and
ethics reforms proposed in Measure 22 and created a voter approval
requirement for any future legislatively-proposed amendments or
repeal to take effect.37 The amendment did not pass, garnering only
slightly more than 45% of the vote.38 This result highlights one potential
issue with governing by initiative: consecutive or even simultaneous
initiatives can receive inconsistent amounts of support, which only
makes it more difficult to determine voters’ actual intent. This becomes
relevant, as demonstrated below, in the face of standards that constrain
the legislature based on the core purposes of an initiative.39
B. Term Limits in Idaho
In Idaho, voters approved Initiative 2 in 1994 to impose term limits
on U.S. Representatives and Senators, and on state and local elected
officials.40 Idaho voters overwhelmingly passed Initiative 2 with 59% of
the vote.41 In 1996, after the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that stateimposed term limits on U.S. Representatives and Senators were
36 Id. While the legislature passed eight bills aimed at “creating lobbyist restrictions,
allowing for investigation of wrongdoing in state government, and requiring more
disclosure in campaign finance,” it did not approve a public campaign finance system,
lower campaign contribution limits, or ban certain gifts from lobbyists as proposed
under Measure 22. Dana Ferguson, After Promising to Replace, Did Lawmakers Deliver
on IM22?, ARGUS LEADER (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/
politics/2017/03/11/after-promising-replace-did-lawmakers-deliver-im22/9901
4304.
37 James Nord, Ethics Measure Approved to be on South Dakota’s 2018 Ballot, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ethics-measureapproved-to-be-on-south-dakotas-2018-ballot.
38 South
Dakota
Election
Results,
N.Y. TIMES (May
15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-southdakota-elections.html.
39 See discussion infra Part IV.
40 IDAHO CODE § 34-907 (1995). Though there were federal constitutional defects
with respect to the law’s applicability to federal elections that would ultimately be
litigated, this Comment examines this and other Idaho initiatives solely for their effects
on state and local officials. Initiative 2 “established that certain persons shall not be
eligible to have his or her name placed upon the primary or general election ballot[,]”
although it did not prohibit voters from writing that person’s name on the ballot, nor did
it prevent candidates from conducting write-in campaigns. Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38
P.3d 598, 601–02 (Idaho 2001) (internal quotation omitted). For an overview of Idaho’s
initiative process and the events surrounding the term limits repeal, see Scott W. Reed,
How and Why Idaho Terminated Term Limits, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 12 (2014).
41 IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE, ELECTION DIVISION, IDAHO INITIATIVE HISTORY (2019),
https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/inithist.htm.
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unconstitutional, Idaho voters enacted a second initiative that required
candidates for Congress and the state legislature to “pledge to support
term limits.”42 Portions of this second initiative were struck down as
unconstitutional under the Idaho state constitution, but the instruction
that members of Congress and state legislators support term limits was
upheld.43 In 1998, Idaho voters again passed an initiative in favor of
term limits, this time “allowing Congressional candidates to sign a term
limits pledge.”44 This third initiative authorized the Secretary of State
“to accept signed term limits pledge[s] from candidates” and required
the Secretary to “place term limits pledge information on ballots” and in
polling places.45
In 2000, local officials sued to have the term limits on state and
local legislators thrown out for being unconstitutional.46 Four state
Republican leaders, who would soon be restricted from appearing on
the ballot, intervened in the lawsuit.47 In Rudeen v. Cenarussa, the Idaho
Supreme Court examined the legality of the entirety of the 1994
initiative and found the term limits on state and local officials to be
constitutional under both the state and federal constitutions.48 The

42 Simpson v. Cenarrusa (In re Writ of Prohibition & Declaratory Judgment), 944
P.2d 1372, 1373 (Idaho 1997). In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court held in U.S. Term Limits
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) that states could not constitutionally impose term
limits on candidates for the U.S House of Representatives or Senate. Thornton left open
the question, however, of whether states could constitutionally impose term limits on
candidates for state or local office. Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 849 (9th Cir. 1997)
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“As an initial matter, Thornton does not speak at all to the
question of whether limits on the terms of state officeholders raises a substantial federal
question. Thornton is concerned exclusively with the constitutionality of state-imposed
term limits on federal officeholders. The Supreme Court’s decision was bottomed on the
Qualifications Clause and the notion of a “national citizenship,” neither of which, of
course, has any relevance to this case.”). In Bates, the Ninth Circuit held that California’s
term limits for elected state officials were constitutional under the first and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 847. Unlike in Thornton, where the Supreme Court scrutinized the
law at issue under the Qualifications Clause, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the California
law under the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 848–49 (O’Scannlain, J.,
concurring).
43 Simpson, 944 P.2d at 1374–76.
44 IDAHO OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, IDAHO VOTERS’ PAMPHLET 3 (1998).
45 Id. Under the initiative, candidates would agree that if they broke their pledge to
voluntarily limit themselves to the term limits passed in previous initiatives, the words
“Broke TERM LIMITS pledge” would appear next to their names on the ballot. Id. at 4.
Although some portions of the initiative were struck down in court, the state could still
publish information about candidates’ position on the term limits pledge in voter
education materials. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 15 P.3d 1129,
1136–37 (Idaho 2000).
46 Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38 P.3d 598, 602 (Idaho 2001).
47 Reed, supra note 40, at 20.
48 Rudeen, 38 P.3d at 609.
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court held that the right to suffrage guaranteed under the state
Constitution did not include the right to hold elected office.49 In so
constraining elected officials’ right to hold office, the court viewed the
1994 initiative as a valid exercise of the electorate’s constitutional
initiative power.50
At the 2000 state Republican convention, a former state legislator
and the sponsor of the term limit repeal effort said of voters’ repeated
support for term limits: “The people have spoken . . . they were
wrong.”51 Idaho, like South Dakota, places no restrictions on legislators’
abilities to alter or repeal enacted initiatives.52 Legislative power lies in
the hands of the legislature, though “[t]he people reserve to themselves
the power to propose laws, and enact the same at the polls independent
of the legislature.”53 In February 2001, only two months after the 1994
term limits law was unanimously upheld in Rudeen, the state legislature
declared a legislative emergency and overrode the Governor’s veto to
repeal the law, despite repeated public support over the course of three
successive initiative campaigns.54 Governor Kempthorne stated that his
veto was “a question of process, and the will of the voters cannot be
ignored and must be protected.”55 Before the repeal, “an estimated 60%
of local officials were scheduled to be term-limited out of office in 2002
. . . . Local officials and their supporters . . . lobbied legislators
(especially rural ones) to overturn the ban on terms.”56
Bart Davis, who served as Senate Majority Caucus Chairman in
2002 during the repeal effort, penned a law review article explaining the
legislature’s rationale. Mr. Davis stated in his article that “the legislature
repealed term limits because it could. Though brashly stated, the
legislature substituted its judgment for the will of the people. Whether
it should or not, is in the eye of the beholder.”57 Mr. Davis argued that
the legislature “was in a unique position to see the effects of term limits
49

Id. at 604.
Id.
51 Bart M. Davis, Idaho’s Messy History with Term Limits: A Modest Response, 52 IDAHO
L. REV. 463, 466 (2016) (alterations and internal quotations omitted) (citing Mark
Warbis, Idaho Republicans Seek to End Term Limits, SPOKESMAN-REV., June 25, 2000, at
B3).
52 See IDAHO CONST. art III, § 1; IDAHO CODE § 34-1801 (2019).
53 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1.
54 In re Writ of Mandamus And/Or for Writ of Prohibition, 92 P.3d 1063, 1064 (Idaho
2002); Michael Janofsky, Idaho Legislature Repeals Term Limit Law, Undoing VoterApproved Measure, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2002, at A13.
55 Id.
56 Daniel A. Smith, Overturning Term Limits: The Legislature’s Own Private Idaho?, 36
POL. SCI. & POL. 215, 216 (2003).
57 Davis, supra note 51, at 485.
50
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in other states, reasonably project those effects in Idaho, and
understand the damage they would do at the local level.”58 Implicit in
this argument is that the public could not—and did not—see and
understand the effects that happened in other states. They could not, in
his estimation, make a calculated decision about the long-term effects of
term limits on political life in Idaho. Of legislators that voted to repeal,
only eleven were defeated in the following election, although some were
defeated as a result of redistricting.59 This does not, however, prove that
voters were not troubled by the legislative rebuke but instead suggests
the significant incumbency advantages that term limits were designed
to protect against.60
Idaho’s saga with term limits further demonstrates the limited role
of the judiciary in protecting the will of the people, as expressed in an
initiative. Two citizens challenged the legislature’s repeal of the 1994
Term Limits Act in court.61 The court held not only that the legislature
was not limited under the Idaho Constitution in terms of its ability to
repeal enacted initiatives but also that the judiciary may not secondguess the legislature’s decision to declare a legislative emergency to do
so.62 The court expressed a generalized skepticism toward engaging the
“legislative process,” arguing instead that its role is “the determination
of the constitutionality of action of other branches of government but
only when the time and circumstances are appropriate.”63 Inherent in
this decision is a larger problem of how voters may be afforded a remedy
in cases where their ability to choose their legislators is undermined
through the legitimate legislative process. This issue is examined in
greater depth below.64

58

Id. at 485.
Id. at 491.
60 See discussion infra Section III.A.
61 In re Writ of Mandamus And/Or for Writ of Prohibition, 92 P.3d 1063, 1065
(2002). While the Idaho Supreme Court did not address whether a citizen at large, who
voted in favor of the repealed initiative, had standing to challenge the repeal, the case
was allowed to proceed on the basis that another plaintiff was a potential candidate for
an office held at that time by an incumbent who would be barred from seeking
reelection, and thus had suffered injury. Id.
62 Id. at 1067 (citing Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129 (Idaho 1987)).
63 In re Writ, 92 P.3d at 1067–68.
64 See infra Part III.
59
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C. Voting Rights Restoration in Florida
While initiated statutes are in most cases easily subject to
legislative amendment or repeal, initiated constitutional amendments,
at least theoretically, are more difficult for state legislatures to subvert.
One potential solution to the dynamics at play in South Dakota and
Idaho may be to enshrine the proposals enacted by initiative and
legislatively repealed in a constitutional amendment. But as recent
events in Florida demonstrate, this strategy is similarly susceptible to
legislative influence in ways that subvert the initiative’s core purposes.
Florida is unique among the states examined here in that it does not
allow initiated state statutes; the only permissible ballot initiatives are
initiated constitutional amendments.65 Lawmakers cannot directly alter
the language of constitutional amendments as they would be able to
amend an approved initiated statute but instead must submit proposed
amendments to the voters, except where the proposed amendments
limit the government’s power to raise revenue.66 Even so, lawmakers
can interpret language in the initiated constitutional amendments in
order to shape their meaning, as occurred following Amendment 4’s
ratification.
In 2018, Florida voters enacted Amendment 4, a constitutional
amendment designed to automatically restore voting rights to
individuals with felony convictions, excluding murderers and sex
offenders, “upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or
probation.”67 Prior to Amendment 4, felony conviction resulted in
permanent disenfranchisement unless the Governor chose to restore an
individual’s rights through clemency.68 Florida’s now-defunct felony
disenfranchisement law dates back to an era before Reconstruction.69
As of 2016, the law disenfranchised 21% of Florida’s African American
voting-age population.70 The Amendment 4 campaign aimed to amend

65

FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
67 FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a).
68 Erika L. Wood, Florida: An Outlier in Denying Voting Rights, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
3 (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/florida-outlierdenying-voting-rights.
69 Id. Florida first enacted a felony disenfranchisement law in 1845, before African
Americans were granted the right to vote. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214,
1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing the history of felon disenfranchisement in Florida).
Three years prior, the state enacted Black Codes, which corresponded with an increase
in prosecution of and higher penalties for crimes the legislature believed were more
likely to be committed by blacks. Wood, supra note 68, at 4.
70 CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, SARAH SHANNON & RYAN LARSON, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATELEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 16 (2016),
66
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the state constitution to automatically restore the voting rights of
individuals with felony convictions, excluding murderers and sex
offenders.71
In November 2018, over 64% of Floridians voted to amend their
state constitution and restore the voting rights to those affected by the
felon disenfranchisement provision.72 The Florida Constitution now
requires that “any disqualification from voting arising from a felony
conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon
completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.”73
Although legislators are bound to respect the voting rights of felons who
complete their sentences, the amendment itself does not define what
completing one’s sentence entails. The legislative response to
Amendment 4 undermined its core purpose by redefining key terms
from the initiative’s language. On May 6, 2019, Governor DeSantis
signed into law S.B. 7066, which defined the key phrase “completion of
all terms of sentence” to encompass the payment of all fines and fees
ordered by a court as part of the sentence or as a condition of
supervision, including probation, community control, or parole.74
Voting rights are not restored until all fees, fines, and restitution
imposed as part of the sentence for a felony conviction are repaid, even
those that a judge has converted into a civil lien.75

https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-levelestimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016.
71 The actual text of the ballot initiative read:
No. 4 Constitutional Amendment Article VI, Section 4. Voting
Restoration Amendment This amendment restores the voting rights
of Floridians with felony convictions after they complete all terms of
their sentence including parole or probation. The amendment would
not apply to those convicted of murder or sexual offenses, who would
continue to be permanently barred from voting unless the Governor
and Cabinet vote to restore their voting rights on a case by case basis.
Official Sample Ballot, General Election, Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.flagler
elections.com/Portals/Flagler/pdfs/2018-General-Sample-Ballot-Mailing.pdf.
72 FLA. DEPT. OF STATE DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, supra note 1.
73 FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a).
74 FLA. STAT. § 98.0751 (2019). These conditions are completed, under S.B. 7066,
only through actual payment, termination of the obligation by the court upon the payee’s
approval through appearance in court or through notarized consent, or completion of
all community service hours if the court converts the financial obligation to community
service. Id.
75 Id. See also Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1291 (N.D. Fla. 2019)
(“Conversion to a civil lien, usually at the time of sentencing, is a longstanding Florida
procedure that courts often use for obligations a criminal defendant cannot afford to
pay.”).
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At first glance, S.B. 7066 seems to merely interpret the terms of
Amendment 4, but the context in which its definition of sentence
“completion” operates dramatically limits the amendment’s practical
effect relative to voters’ reasonable expectations of voting rights
restoration.76 Between 1996 and 2012, Florida legislators created
twenty new categories of legal financial obligations (LFOs), or fines and
fees imposed by a court for various services, penalties, and mandatory
surcharges, while simultaneously eliminating exceptions for those
unable to pay.77 The Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) Chief of
Admission admitted that FDOC has practically no way of knowing if an
individual has not repaid financial obligations after their formal
supervision has been completed.78 The state does not maintain a
database of LFOs,79 and courts often order individuals to pay restitution
directly to victims, for which there are no receipts of documentation.80
The Florida Clerk of the Courts Association expects that 83% of LFOs
will go unpaid.81 Further, S.B. 7066 does not require courts to assess an
individual’s ability to pay.82 Individuals who are unable to pay back
76

See Jones, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1295.
See Rebekah Diller, The Hidden Cost of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. 5–7 (March 23, 2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/hidden-costs-floridas-criminal-justice-fees.
78 Hearing on the Implementation of Amendment 4 Before Jnt. House Meeting of the
Criminal J. Subcomm. & the Judiciary Comm. (Fla. 2019), at 1:18, https://theflorida
channel.org/videos/2-14-19-joint-house-meeting-of-the-criminal-justicesubcommittee-and-the-judiciary-committee.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 54:18.
81 See Rivero, supra note 4.
82 In a recent court decision, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Florida issued a narrow preliminary injunction on S.B. 7066 on the basis of inability to
pay. See Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1309 (N.D. Fla. 2019), rev’d, 975 F.3d
1016 (11th Cir. 2020). The district court applied the injunction only with respect to the
defendants bringing suit but not to the public at large, holding that “the State of Florida
cannot deny an individual plaintiff the right to vote just because the plaintiff lacks the
financial resources to pay.” Id. But see Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1056
(11th Cir. 2020) (Lagoa, J., concurring) (reasoning that felons in Florida “are not
deprived of reenfranchisement solely based on inability to pay” because S.B. 7066
provides three alternative avenues for rights restoration: “termination of the obligation
by the payee; conversion of LFOs to community service hours; and judicial modification
of the original sentencing order.”). The district court declined to address core issues
about the purpose of Amendment 4 as understood by a reasonable voter, deferring to
the Florida Supreme Court’s Advisory Opinion. Jones, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1291. The
Eleventh Circuit ultimately stayed the injunction, reasoning that, despite its procedural
defects, Amendment 4 and S.B. 7066 do not abridge rights guaranteed by the federal
Equal Protection Clause, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, or the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d at 1037, 1040, 1049, 1056.
In doing so, the Court chose not to consider the reasons that voters may actually have
chosen to enact the law, see text accompanying notes 91–95, and instead imputed other
77
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their financial obligations will be disenfranchised as a result of their
felony convictions. If over 80% of LFOs go unpaid, and Florida has no
means to determine who has or has not paid those obligations that are
actually fulfilled, the restorative effect of Amendment 4 will be
dramatically limited, contrary to its core purpose.83
S.B. 7066 interprets Amendment 4 as creating a voting rights
restoration scheme in which those felons who have the means to pay off
their LFOs—and only those felons—may have their voting rights
restored.84 There are also procedural problems with S.B. 7066 that
undermine the intent of Amendment 4.85 The fees subject to repayment
under the statute must be documented in the sentencing document

rational justifications for the law’s restrictive interpretation consistent with its ruling,
Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d at 1035 (“Before extending the franchise to even more felons,
Florida may have wished to test the waters by reenfranchising only those who complete
their full sentences.”); id. at 1037 (“[T]he face of the amendment makes clear that
Florida voters do not share the dissenters’ view that it is unjust to tell some criminals
that they have incurred debts to society that will never be repaid. . . . Florida’s voters
intended only to reenfranchise felons who have been fully rehabilitated, and Senate Bill
7066 drew a rational line in pursuit of that goal.”); id. at 1057–58 (Pryor, C.J.,
concurring) (“To argue that the purpose of Amendment 4 was to reenfranchise a
particular percentage of felons that this Court deems acceptable is to ignore the words
adopted by the people of Florida when they amended their constitution.”). The Court
employs the same textualist analysis as the Florida Supreme Court’s Advisory Opinion,
see text accompanying notes 88–95 infra, finding voters’ motivations clear from the text
of Amendment 4 itself rather than any of the publicity or campaign materials that
reasonably shaped voters’ expectations as to what they were actually voting for. The
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is thus abjectly divorced from the popular perceptions that
motivated Amendment 4’s enactment in the first place, and so only further erodes the
will of the electorate by legitimating the legislature’s interpretation of the sentence
completion requirement.
83 This is not the first time that the Florida legislature has employed this strategy to
undermine voter-initiated constitutional amendments. In 2016, Florida voters
approved Amendment 2, now codified as FLA. CONST. art. 10 § 29(d), which allowed
distribution and use of medical marijuana. Fla. Dep’t of Health v. People United for Med.
Marijuana, 250 So. 3d 825, 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). In 2017, lawmakers passed a
bill that expressly excluded from the definition of medical use “possession, use, or
administration of marijuana in a form for smoking.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.986(1)(j)(2).
Though Governor DeSantis ultimately repealed the provision, legalizing the smoking of
medical marijuana, the litigation faced substantial hurdles as the Florida Court of
Appeals found that the challengers had not met their burden of showing that the statute
was facially unconstitutional and vacated the lower court’s stay. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 250
So. 3d at 828.
84 See Jones, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1297 (arguing that voters likely did not interpret
Amendment 4 to “condition the right to vote on the payment of fees for representation
by a public defender.”).
85 Indeed, many of these problems are features of the implementing legislation, not
bugs. See Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d at 1110–11 (Jill Pryor, J., dissenting) (detailing the
ways in which the legislature enacted S.B. 7066 with either knowledge or willful
disregard for the bureaucratic deficiencies surrounding its effective implementation).
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promulgated by the sentencing court.86 Many counties in Florida,
however, routinely fail to produce sentencing documents upon request,
meaning that even if a person believes that they have repaid their LFOs,
they may be unable to verify that belief and risk voting where they are
barred from doing so.87 Either in purpose or effect, or both, S.B. 7066
controverts the voters’ reasonable interpretation of Amendment 4’s
intent to restore the franchise to individuals with felony convictions.
These events demonstrate that even a substantive constitutional
amendment does not insulate voters’ will on electoral reforms from
legislative revision. Here, legislators foresaw a sea change in voter
registration that could have dramatically reshaped the political
landscape in Florida and, despite Amendment 4’s status as a
constitutional amendment rather than an ordinary statute, took action
to limit its political effect. Florida legislators’ actions further
demonstrate the proposition that there must be stronger protections in
place for voters to expand the franchise through election and voting
reforms without subjecting those reforms to legislators’ perverse
incentive structures.
This context makes the Florida Supreme Court’s Advisory Opinion
on Amendment 4’s implementation even more problematic from a
legislative nullification perspective. The court found the plain meaning
of the Amendment’s text to unambiguously include LFOs as a
prerequisite to voting rights restoration.88 At the outset of its opinion,
the court explicitly rejected consideration of voter intent as a threshold
matter for interpreting the provision, despite substantial precedent
favoring such analysis.89 The court cautioned against examining such
86 See FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2019); Daniel Rivero, Everything You Need to Know
About Florida’s Amendment 4 Lawsuit, WLRN PUBLIC RADIO AND TELEVISION (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/everything-you-need-know-about-floridas-amendment4-lawsuit.
87 Id.
88 Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting
Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 2020).
89 In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597,
599 (Fla. 2012) (applying the “approach that has been consistently undertaken when
interpreting constitutional provisions”); Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla.
1978) (“In construing the Constitution, we first seek to ascertain the intent of the
framers and voters, and to interpret the provision before us in the way that will best
fulfill that intent.”); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So.2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960) (“The fundamental
object to be sought in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of
the framers and the provision must be construed or interpreted in such manner as to
fulfil the intent of the people, never to defeat it. Such a provision must never be
construed in such manner as to make it possible for the will of the people to be frustrated
or denied.”). But see Edwards v. Thomas, 229 So. 3d 277, 283–84 (Fla. 2017) (pointing
to the standard recited in Gray but proceeding to first examine the plain text of the
provision at issue).
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extrinsic evidence on the basis that it may “shift the focus of
interpretation from the text and its context to extraneous
considerations.”90 But the court’s approach, particularly when applied
to constitutional amendments enacted through popular initiative, is
more likely to frustrate the original intent behind the law relative to
ordinary statutory enactments passed through traditional legislative
procedures.
The problem with Amendment 4 is that its language does not
preclude the legislature from acting in this way, nor the court from so
enshrining a restrictive interpretation of the Amendment’s language
into state constitutional law. While S.B. 7066 likely frustrates voters’
reasonable understanding of the Amendment as they voted for it, the
Amendment’s language does not necessarily preclude such an
interpretation of the “terms” of one’s sentence.91 But “voters are not
professional lawmakers, so it is problematic to impute to the electorate
the same knowledge about law, legal terminology, and legislative
context that courts routinely ascribe . . . to legislators.”92 Taking such a
strict textualist approach to interpreting ballot initiatives or initiated
amendments is bound to produce anomalous results where the courts
are holding voters to the same standards as seasoned legislators.93
Courts “widely ignore media and advertising as sources of popular
intent even though . . . research about voter behavior in ballot
campaigns suggests that voters most regularly consult and seek
guidance from these sources.”94 Indeed, the parties advocating for a
broader interpretation of the Amendment point to precisely these types
of materials to assert that the electorate understood Amendment 4 to
exclude fines and fees from its requirements.95 Though the Florida
Supreme Court points to statements made by Amendment 4 sponsors in
their legal briefs and oral arguments—which it is quick to emphasize
played no role in their determination of the unambiguous meaning of
90

Advisory Opinion, 288 So. 3d at 1078.
See Initial Brief of the Florida House of Representatives at 9–10, Advisory Opinion
to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend., 288
So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 2020) (No. Sc19-1341) (“[C]onsidered in isolation, the phrase ‘terms
of sentence’ and its component words can take multiple meanings.”).
92 Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 110 (1995).
93 See Glen Staszewski, The Changing Landscape of Election Law: Essay: Contestatory
Democracy and the Interpretation of Popular Initiatives, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1165, 1167
(2013).
94 Schacter, supra note 92, at 111.
95 Reply Brief for the Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Fla. et al. at 14, Advisory Opinion to
the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So.
3d 1070 (Fla. 2020) (No. Sc19-1341).
91
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the Amendment’s text96—it is plausible that these statements and
intentions are divorced from voters’ reasonable understanding of the
Amendment as it was proposed and disseminated through mass media.
Alas, “we are all textualists now.”97 There is no denying that
Amendment 4 could have been drafted more precisely and that its
supporters could have avoided tactical errors in discussing the
Amendment’s scope, both have adversely impacted their success
challenging S.B. 7066.98 In Florida, as in Idaho, the court acted in a
manner that did not account for the will of the people and their intent in
passing the measure in question.
D. Lessons Learned from Idaho, South Dakota, and Florida
By limiting the franchise, legislators restrict who comprises the
electorate, disproportionately impacting minorities who have been
subject to disparities inherent in the criminal justice system.99 While
African Americans represent 13% of Florida’s voting population, more
than 44% of those registered to vote after the approval of Amendment
4 but before S.B. 7066 being passed were African American.100 In South
Dakota, by repealing the campaign finance measures, the legislature
determined how its members can raise funds for their reelection
campaigns.
Whereas voters desired to lower the permissible
contribution limits and establish a system of public financing,
lawmakers chose a different course that would directly impact how they
may seek reelection. In Idaho, voters, again and again, expressed their
desire to limit the amount of time one powerful person can spend in
political office. Legislators said no. When courts go one step further and
decline to inquire into voters’ reasonable intent as to initiated statutes
and amendments, the intent of those reforms is further undermined.
These choices directly affect voters’ power to freely choose their
representatives, in the same ways that redistricting threatens to
96

Advisory Opinion, 288 So. 3d at 1078.
Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice
Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg.
98 See Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The
Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1085–87 (Fla. 2020) (Labarga, J.,
dissenting in part) (concluding that, even after consideration of extrinsic evidence,
including statements made by Amendment 4’s sponsors in support of the inclusion of
restitution and fines and fees, Amendment 4 encompasses such considerations within
the meaning of “all terms of sentence”).
99 Kevin Morris, Thwarting Amendment 4, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., (May 9, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/2019_05_FloridaAmend
ment_FINAL-3.pdf.
100 Id. at 1.
97
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entrench lawmakers in office against voters’ wishes. The next Part
examines current political and legal circumstances that limit voters’
ability to push back against legislative nullification without altering the
balance of legislative power in their favor.
III. STATES SHOULD ADOPT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS LIMITING
LEGISLATURES’ ABILITIES TO NULLIFY VOTING AND ELECTORAL INITIATIVE
RESULTS
Regardless of the formal weight given to the electorate’s legislative
authority vis a vis its state legislature, when it comes to rights and
processes that substantially affect the legislature’s responsiveness to
the electorate’s political will, those rights and procedures “must
nonetheless be protected, strenuously so, because they are critical to the
functioning of an open and effective democratic process.”101 With a few
important exceptions, American democracy generally relies on the
prospect that the person who gets the most votes in an election will go
on to represent the constituency that elected her. But what one sees
with initiatives is quite different; legislatures have assumed a power of
review over voters’ decisions that is akin to expelling a duly elected
member of the legislature through majority vote based solely on what
others think of that person’s policy preferences. In South Dakota, where
the legislature essentially declared of its own volition the popular
campaign finance initiative to be constitutionally suspect, legislators
began to blur the line between lawmaking and judicial review.102
Likewise, in Idaho, legislators overruled the repeated affirmations of the
electorate in support of term limits on state and local officials.
This Part contends first that the current political environment has
created conditions and incentive structures that make establishing
proper guardrails to prevent legislative misbehavior all the more
important. Second, this Part asserts that legislative nullification creates
a generalized public injury with no means of redress. By repealing
electoral and voting initiatives, legislatures have at their disposal a
means of pretextually declaring initiated legislation unconstitutional in
order to second-guess the judgments of a co-equal legislative body.
Even where an initiative is of questionable constitutionality, legislatures
thus take decisions about legality and redress away from the courts and
prevent their constituents from accessing any substantial remedies in
101

JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105 (1980).
Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“When
Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for
permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the
principle of separation of powers.”).
102
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light of the existing political dynamics and in favor of pretextual ends.
To combat these dynamics, states should adopt constitutional
amendments which procedurally and substantively constrain
legislators’ freedom to amend or repeal initiated statutes.
A. Problematic Politics Necessitate Structural Constitutional
Changes
Contrary to traditional assumptions that legislators act in
accordance with the views of a majority of their constituents, and indeed
are incentivized to do so based on their desire to be reelected, the
initiatives examined above lend credence to a second hypothesis:
incumbency advantages and political structures may, at this moment, be
so substantial as to alter legislators’ incentives such that they are now
able to balance the will of their constituencies against a reduced risk of
being voted out of office given institutional advantages that facilitate
incumbent reelection.103
The California Constitution expressly
acknowledges these incentives:
The people find and declare that the Founding Fathers
established a system of representative government based
upon free, fair, and competitive elections. The increased
concentration of political power in the hands of incumbent
representatives has made our electoral system less free, less
competitive, and less representative. . . . [U]nfair incumbent
advantages discourage qualified candidates from seeking
public office and create a class of career politicians, instead of
the citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding
Fathers. These career politicians become representatives of
the bureaucracy, rather than of the people whom they are
elected to represent.104
California explicitly restricts terms, retirement benefits, and statefinanced incumbent staff and support services on this basis.105
Incumbency in and of itself creates immense advantages for state
legislators seeking reelection. In 2015 and 2016, state legislators
running as incumbents in contested elections, but who lacked a
103 For example, in 2018, only 14% of incumbent state legislators nationwide who
faced a primary challenge ultimately lost their seats. Incumbents Defeated in 2018’s State
Legislative Elections, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Incumbents_defeated_in_
2018%27s_state_legislative_elections; see also Ciara O’Neill, Money and Incumbency in
State Legislative Races, 2015 and 2016, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN POLITICS (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/money-incumbency-in2015-and-2016-state-legislative-races (finding that 92% of incumbent legislators kept
their seats in 2015–16 elections).
104 CAL. CONST. art IV, § 1.5.
105 Id.
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monetary advantage over their opponent, won their elections in 92% of
cases.106 This figure does not include the 40% of incumbent legislators
who ran for their seats unopposed.107 Of sixty-four incumbent South
Dakota legislators who ran for reelection in 2016, the same election in
which the public approved a campaign finance and ethics overhaul via
initiative, sixty, or 94%, were reelected to another term.108
Other scholars have advanced alternative explanations for
legislative nullification of majoritarian initiatives, namely that, due to a
growing urban-rural divide, legislators vote in accordance with the
views of their constituency while undermining the will of the electorate
as a whole.109 Daniel A. Smith points to this dynamic to explain Idaho’s
term limits repeal, in particular, arguing that voters in rural counties
were “significantly less likely than residents of urban counties to
support the term limits measure.”110
It is reasonable that South Dakota voters, in this context, would be
interested in passing campaign finance and ethics reforms to curb
legislators’ ability to seek or achieve reelection. Voters have a
cognizable interest in limiting lawmakers’ power to “entrench
themselves in office as against voters’ preferences.”111 Career
legislators have clear incentives to reject systemic changes that might
affect their ability to remain in office. Term limits are the most direct
example. As the events in Idaho demonstrate, if given the opportunity
to obstruct term limits and remain in office, legislators will jump at that
chance.112 As John H. Ely has argued, “[c]ourts must police . . . political
activity because we cannot trust elected officials to do so: ins have a way
of wanting to make sure the outs stay out.”113 These interests have been
on display in recent, high-profile redistricting litigation.114 Legislators
106

O’Neill, supra note 103.
Id.
108 Id.
109 Daniel A. Smith, Representation and the Spatial Bias of Direct Democracy, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1420 (2007).
110 Id. at 1426.
111 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
112 See Jerry D. Spangler & Bob Bernick Jr., Utah Senators Vote to Repeal Term-Limits
Law, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 25, 2003), https://www.deseret.com/2003/2/25/19706340/
utah-senators-vote-to-repeal-term-limits-law (discussing the Utah legislature’s repeal
of a term limits law that was enacted in order to preempt a ballot initiative on the same
subject). Only fifteen states have currently enacted term limits for state legislators,
though four states had their legislative term limits thrown out by their state supreme
courts. The Term-Limited States, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (last updated Nov. 12,
2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limitsstates.aspx.
113 ELY, supra note 101, at 106.
114 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509.
107

DODGE (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/8/2021 10:57 PM

COMMENT

1339

have notoriously taken steps across the country to stack the
redistricting process in favor of the party in power to the point of
infringing upon citizens’ right to vote.115
Though relatively weaker than incumbency advantages,
candidates who possessed a monetary advantage, but not an
incumbency advantage, still won 80% of seats.116 Particularly in
Republican-controlled states, the post-Citizens United campaign finance
landscape features a significant electoral advantage for state house
candidates.117 One study showed not only that Citizens United increased
the odds of victory for Republicans in state house races, but was also
correlated with a 5% increase in the likelihood that a Republican
incumbent seeks reelection in those contests.118 The same study found
a statistically significant correlation between Citizens United and a
roughly 10% decrease in Democratic candidates entering state house
races.119 Incumbency and monetary advantages create dynamics where
even when legislators behave in a manner that a majority of voters
dislike, such as substantially altering recently enacted initiatives, there
are still significant barriers to removing those people from office and
reshaping the state legislature in the image of the electorate. Incumbent
support for an initiative that has statewide majority support may even
benefit the candidate in their own district come time for reelection.120
The next Section discusses why, given these dynamics, legislatures are
emboldened to amend, repeal, or redefine initiatives enacted with broad
support from the electorate.

115 See id. at 2493 (discussing instances of alleged partisan gerrymandering in
Maryland and North Carolina); League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d
737, 741 (Pa. 2018); see also Maggie Astor & K.K. Rebecca Li, What’s Stronger than a Blue
Wave? Gerrymandered Districts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/11/29/us/politics/north-carolina-gerrymandering.html; cf. Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2015)
(discussing the constitutionality of Arizona’s independent redistricting commission,
established by initiative to end gerrymandering and improve “voter and candidate
participation in elections”).
116 O’Neill, supra note 103.
117 Tilman Klumpp, Hugo M. Mailon & Michael Williams, The Business of American
Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections, 59 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 3
(2016) (finding that Citizens United was associated with a 4% increase in the likelihood
that a Republican is elected in state house races).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Smith, supra note 109, at 1427.
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B. Preserving Judicial Review
In most states, legislators have the power to create new laws and
amend existing ones.121 But, as demonstrated above,122 legislatures
have occasionally taken it upon themselves to assess the
constitutionality of ballot initiatives before the courts have had an
opportunity to speak on the issues. Even absent constitutional
concerns, legislatures are generally free to repeal laws that they dislike
and replace them with laws they think are better. In the exercise of
unified legislative power, this means a legislature merely revisiting
issues that it has spoken on in the past. In the context of initiatives,
however, where legislative power is bifurcated and voters have
incentives to legislate in areas that their elected representatives find too
politically charged or where they cannot find consensus, the potential
for legislative clash is substantial.
Unlike traditional conflicts between voters and the government,
where citizens may file suit against the body vested with the power to
execute a given law, conflicts arising in the context of repeal or
amendment offer limited remedies for voters whose preferences, as
expressed through the ballot box, have been undermined through the
legislative process. The post-repeal litigation surrounding Idaho’s 1994
Term Limits Act is an excellent demonstration of how the judiciary
offers a limited avenue for redress. Unlike South Dakota, which grants
voters merely the right to “propose” measures subject to a vote by the
electorate,123 the Idaho Constitution reserves to the people “the power
to propose laws, and enact the same at the polls independent of the
legislature.”124 This independent power is undermined where state law
vests the legislature with the power to repeal measures passed by
initiative.125 Proponents of this legislative right argue that the people,
in response, may merely re-enact the same initiative, or instead elect a
majority of legislators who support the initiative in question.126 But
where a legislator’s career is on the line, and the body has already shown
itself disposed to repealing the measure in question, what reason is
there to expect a different outcome if a measure were merely reenacted? Further, because voting and electoral reforms are specifically
examined here, status quo incumbency advantages without voter121 See discussion infra Part IV (discussing how states have limited legislatures’
abilities to amend laws enacted through initiative).
122 See discussion supra Part II.
123 S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1.
124 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1.
125 Luker v. Curtis, 136 P.2d 978, 984 (Idaho 1943) (Holden, C.J., dissenting).
126 See id. at 980.
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approved changes may preclude the election of a more sympathetic
legislature. Given the range of issues that voters consider when casting
their vote, such as who will raise their taxes, who has a better plan for
their community’s schools, and other issues that directly impact
community wellbeing, voters may be hesitant to cast their ballot based
merely on a legislator’s recalcitrance concerning an initiative that a
given voter may have supported in the past. Even if some voters may be
so put off by legislative nullification as to try to unseat offending
legislators, they face a collective action problem alongside their fellow
voters in mustering enough support around that single issue to incite a
response sufficient to overcome incumbency advantages and change the
makeup of the state legislature.127
Under these circumstances, voters’ only remaining remedy is the
courts. There are numerous problems with relying on the courts in the
case of legislative nullification. Repeal, even more than amendment,
presents a problem without significant means for redress. First, in
states like South Dakota that grant voters the power merely to
“propose” laws,128 there are no constitutional constraints on the
legislature’s ability to repeal enacted initiatives.129 Voters, presumably,
would have no cause of action under which to state a claim for relief in
this scenario. Even in states like Idaho, which grant initiative power
“independent of the legislature,” courts have not interpreted that
phraseology to limit legislative power to repeal enacted initiatives.130
Second, state standing laws that closely track federal law may bar
injured voters from seeking relief.131 Though some states, such as South
Dakota and Florida, allow their supreme courts to issue advisory
opinions on issues of executive power,132 most states do not allow for
127

See Anthony Fowler & Andrew B. Hall, Disentangling the Personal and Partisan
Incumbency Advantages: Evidence from Close Elections and Term Limits, 9 Q.J. POL. SCI.
501, 528 (2014) (concluding that incumbency advantages flow specifically to individual
state legislators rather than their parties at large); Sean Luechtefeld & Adam S. Richards,
The Interaction of Issue and Image Frames on Political Candidate Assessment, 67
COMMUNICATION STUDIES 20, 22 (2016) (discussing how “character-focused” messages in
the media affect voter perceptions of a candidate compared with “issue-framed
messages).
128 S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1.
129 Brendtro v. Nelson, 720 N.W.2d 670, 682 (S.D. 2006) (quoting State ex rel.
Richards v. Whisman, 154 N.W. 707, 709 (S.D. 1915)).
130 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1.
131 For an expansive survey of state-by-state standing requirements, see Wyatt
Sassman, A Survey of Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 349 (2015).
132 The South Dakota Supreme Court has defined executive power, for the purpose of
advisory opinions, as “situations in which the exercise of the Governor’s executive
power will result in immediate consequences having an impact on the institutions of
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such opinions devoid of any case or controversy.133 Such standing
requirements restrict voters, who may not have suffered a unique or
particularized injury, from obtaining relief.134 For example, though
Idaho’s state constitution does not contain any “case or controversy”
requirement akin to that in the federal Constitution, Idaho courts have
imposed such a requirement on themselves.135 Though the Idaho
Supreme Court, in In re Writ, found that at least one of the plaintiffs had
standing, the court relied upon a sole plaintiff’s status as a potential
challenger to an incumbent who would otherwise have been termlimited. With respect to reforms that create only “generalized
grievance[s] shared by . . . a large class of citizens,” plaintiffs will
struggle to demonstrate standing.136 Even in cases similar to In re Writ,
plaintiffs seeking political office suffer an injury, which is not necessarily
particularized. In theory, any citizen who wishes to seek public office in
a district with a would-be term-limited incumbent would suffer the
same injury. Just because repeal would impact a given individual’s
campaign does not mean that it is sufficiently particularized.137 Even
granting the Idaho Supreme Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff in In re
Writ had standing, this dilemma puts courts in other states with
standing requirements modeled after the federal regime in a position to

state government or on the welfare of the public and which involve questions that
cannot be answered expeditiously through usual adversary proceedings.” In re Opinion
of the Supreme Court Relative to the Constitutionality of Chapter 239, Session Laws of
1977, 257 N.W.2d 442, 447 (S.D. 1977) (Wollman, J., concurring specially).
133 See Sassman, supra note 131; see also Scott L. Kafker & David A Russcol, Standing
at a Constitutional Divide: Redefining State and Federal Requirements for Initiatives After
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 71 WASH & LEE L. REV. 229, 261–63 (2014) (discussing challenges
of satisfying Article III standing requirements in the ballot initiative context).
134 Generally speaking, initiative petitioners have a right to pre-election standing in
state courts. Id. at 251–53. In contrast, post-passage standing has “not generally been
included in the state laws governing initiatives.” Id. at 261 (arguing that post-election
standing rights should be afforded to initiative petitioners).
135 Emp’rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Ronk, 405 P.3d 33, 36 (Idaho 2017) (citing Coeur d’Alene
Tribe v. Denney, 387 P.3d 761, 766 (Idaho 2015)). Idaho courts require a petitioner to
allege injury in fact, Emplrs Res. Mgmt. Co., 405 P.3d at 36, which requires that the injury
“be ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual and imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical,’” Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54, 62 (Idaho 2017) (quoting State v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 354 P.3d 187, 194 (Idaho 2015)). Petitioners must also show “a substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury.
Miles, 778 P.2d at 763. Standing requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and
fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged
conduct.” Coal for Agric.’s Future v. Canyon Cnty., 369 P.3d 920, 924 (Idaho 2016).
136 Young v. City of Ketchum, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159–60 (Idaho 2002).
137 But see In re Writ of Mandamus And/Or for Writ of Prohibition, 92 P.3d 1063,
1065 (Idaho 2002) (“The legislature’s repeal impacts her campaign, and she
demonstrates a particularized and sufficient injury to establish standing.”).
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avert issues that they feel are legislative in nature easily, and so should
not be determined by the judicial branch.
Even in cases where courts choose to grant standing, however,
legislatures still have distinct advantages. Both the Term Limits Act in
Idaho and Measure 22 in South Dakota were repealed through the use
of declarations of legislative emergency, which allow legislatures to
amend or repeal laws without those actions being subject to
referendum. Legislatures vested with the power to declare such
emergencies essentially have the power to place decisions to repeal or
amend enacted initiatives beyond reproach from the voters.138 While
courts could step in to review declarations of legislative emergency
more aggressively, they have generally hesitated to do so.139 In Idaho,
“the legislature’s determination of an emergency . . . is a policy decision
exclusively within the ambit of legislative authority, and the judiciary
cannot second-guess that decision.”140 In South Dakota, legislators were
able to avoid judicial review of the emergency clause. South Dakota
courts defer to legislative determinations of emergencies so long as the
declaration can, “by any fair inference,”141 be “necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of
the state government and its existing public institutions.”142 H.B. 1069,
the bill that repealed Measure 22, merely parrots this language and
provides no supporting reasons why a declaration of emergency was
necessary other than that it was “necessary for the support of the state
government and its existing public institutions.”143
The exception to these dynamics is Amendment 4 in Florida, which,
by virtue of its status as a constitutional amendment, is not easily
altered. The Florida legislature faces more significant barriers to
undermining Amendment 4’s purpose because it must either act within
a reasonable interpretation of the provision such that the law would not
be subject to constitutional attack or amend the constitution through
traditional processes. But, as the Amendment 4 saga demonstrates, this

138

See Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129, 1133 (declining to review the
legislature’s decision to declare an emergency based on “[t]he respect due to the coequal and independent legislative branch of state government and the need for finality
and certainty about the status of a duly enacted statute”).
139 In re Writ, 92 P.3d at 1067–68; see also State ex rel. Richards v. Whisman, 154 N.W.
707, 711 (S.D. 1915).
140 Leroy, 718 P.2d at 1136.
141 In re Request for Advisory Op. Concerning Constr. of H.B. 1388 as Amended by
H.B. 1389, 387 N.W.2d 239, 242 (S.D. 1986).
142 S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1.
143 H.B. 1069, 2017 Leg. Assemb., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017) (codified as Campaign
Finance Repeal and Revise, 2017 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 72 §§ 1–2 185).
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does not necessarily leave newly restored voting rights untouchable by
legislation that narrowly interprets its language, nor protected by the
state supreme court. Even without repeal or amendment, S.B. 7066 had
the effect of dramatically altering the potential composition of the
electorate based solely on legislators’ preferences. Lawmakers were no
less able to engage in a weighted political calculus, balancing the risk of
losing reelection versus potential benefits of shaping the electorate and
increasing already substantial incumbency advantages.
Modern political dynamics and the limited redress available to
voters through the courts make structural protections on enacted
initiatives all the more important to protecting voter intent. Voters are
less able—and often less willing—to vote their incumbent legislators
out of office. Incumbency and monetary advantages create such
profound electoral handicaps for legislators that the incentive to act in
favor of the majority will is lessened. As Idaho’s experience with term
limit repeal demonstrates, even after legislators willfully flaunt the
desires of a majority of voters, the consequences may be minimal for
those who voted against their constituents’ expressed desires.144
Creating structural protections for voting and electoral reforms
constrains legislators’ abilities to act anti-democratically in their selfinterest by limiting the franchise, lowering ethical standards, or relaxing
campaign finance restrictions in the face of opposition from voters. The
next Part examines different approaches that protect voter-enacted
initiatives against legislative self-interest.
IV. EVALUATING APPROACHES FOR FAITHFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF VOTING AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS
The political and legal dynamics outlined above emphasize the
need not merely for state constitutional enshrinement of priorities set
forth in nullified initiatives but also for systemic protections for voters’
initiative power in states that feature a constitutional right to initiative.
While initiated constitutional amendments seeking policy ends
themselves have traditionally been used to sidestep self-interested
legislators who perceive them as a threat to their political careers,145
these substantive amendments are themselves susceptible to the same
types of sabotage as Amendment 4 in Florida. By conferring the right
itself, rather than protections against the legislature’s ability to alter
that right in the future, substantive amendments are susceptible to
144

See discussion supra Section II.B.
John Dinan, Symposium: Law & Politics in the Age of Direct Democracy: State
Constitutional Initiative Processes and Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 19 CHAP.
L. REV. 61, 76 (2016).
145
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legislative tampering that rely on existing safeguards under the law. As
South Dakota and Idaho demonstrate, these safeguards can fall short of
protecting the will of the electorate. In contrast, what this Comment will
call “means-oriented” amendments provide the electorate with a lower
electoral bar to clear to enact policy change while creating potentially
higher legislative barriers to amendment. Means-oriented amendments
can include procedural protections as well as protective substantive
standards that limit the legislature’s ability to amend or repeal an
initiated law. Particularly with respect to the 19 states that allow for
initiated constitutional amendments, whether direct or indirect, meansoriented amendments in this vein may be the most promising avenue to
ensure that future statutory initiatives remain intact.146 While meansoriented initiatives may be subject to some of the same vulnerabilities
as substantive amendments, they protect future substantive
amendments from legislative attack. This Part outlines approaches that
different states have taken concerning means-oriented amendments
that limit legislative capacity to amend enacted initiatives.
Means-oriented amendments offer two key benefits for the people
in successfully implementing reforms that counter legislators’ perverse
incentives. First, they offer direct protection against repeal and
amendment that would threaten the core purposes of initiated voting
and electoral reforms. Second, once in place, this type of amendment
allows the electorate not only to vote their respective legislators out of
office—a challenge that, given existing incumbent advantages, is
difficult to surmount—but also to threaten implementation of electoral
and voting reforms through a strengthened initiative process with a
higher bar for legislative amendment or repeal. This threat, even if not
carried out, provides voters with a powerful tool to pressure legislators
to act in majoritarian ways.
Beyond the context of voting and electoral initiatives, states have
implemented different procedural and substantive constraints on their
legislature’s ability to amend enacted initiatives generally. In terms of
procedural constraints, some states have imposed supermajority
requirements on legislatures attempting unilaterally to amend
implemented initiatives.147 Other states employ restrict how soon after
146

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM STATES (Jan.
18, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-theinitiative-states.aspx.
147 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 1, § 1(6)(C) (three-fourths vote in each house); ARK. CONST.
art. V, § 1 (two-thirds of each house); MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9 (three fourths vote in each
house); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2 (two-thirds of unicameral legislature); N.D. CONST. art. III,
§ 8 (two-thirds of each house); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 41 (two-thirds of each house for
first two years after enactment).
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passage the legislature may amend an initiative.148 Only two states,
California and Arizona, currently have voter approval requirements,
which require amendments to approved initiatives to be approved via a
second initiative.149 Unlike California, which requires voter approval
unless otherwise stipulated in the initiative itself, Arizona allows for
unilateral legislative amendment so long as the amendment “furthers
the purposes” of the measure and passes with a three-fourths
supermajority in both houses of the legislature.150 The Arizona
legislature can also submit proposed amendments to enacted initiatives
to the voters through legislatively referred ballot initiatives. What this
Comment calls the “furthers the purpose” standard is a more
substantive constraint that requires the legislature to consider the will
of the voters when amending a statute enacted by initiative. These
substantive and procedural constraints are often used in combination,
as in Arizona, to set a substantially higher bar for amending initiated
statutes. These constraints create a category of laws that require broad
legislative support—a rare thing in today’s hyperpartisan political
climate—to alter.
In 1998, Arizona voters passed the Voter Protection Act (VPA),
which amended their state constitution by way of initiative to limit how
legislatures may amend successfully enacted initiatives. Prior to
enactment, legislators could amend approved initiatives “by a majority
vote . . . [unless] that ballot measure was approved by a majority of the
people . . . registered to vote in [Arizona], rather than by a majority of
the people who voted on the ballot measure.”151 The VPA amended the
Arizona Constitution to restrict legislative changes to those that
“further[] the purpose” of the initiative.152 This provision prohibits the
148 ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6 (two years to repeal, can amend immediately); NEV. CONST.
art. IXX, § 2 (three years before legislature can repeal, amend, annul, or suspend); N.D.
CONST. art. III, § 8 (seven years before repeal or amendment, except with two-thirds vote
of each house); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 41 (two-thirds of each house for first two years
after enactment); WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52(f) (two years before repeal but may be
amended immediately).
149 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(1); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c); see also Legislative
Alteration, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Legislative_alteration.
150 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C); see also Lisa T. Hauser, The Powers of Initiative
and Referendum: Keeping the Arizona Constitution’s Promise of Direct Democracy, 44 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 567, 586 n.129 (2012).
151 Arizona Sec’y of State, 1998 General Election Ballot Measures, Proposition 105
Analysis by Legislative Council 47, https://apps.azsos.gov/election/1998/Info/Pub
Pamphlet/prop105.html.
152 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C) (“The legislature shall not have the power to
amend an initiative measure approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, or to
amend a referendum measure decided by a majority of the votes cast thereon, unless
the amending legislation furthers the purposes of such measure and at least three-
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legislature from repealing the approved initiative,153 prevents the
Governor from vetoing approved initiatives,154 and creates a new
amendment process that binds legislators in terms of the degree to
which they may amend the initiative without voter approval.155 To
amend any initiative, even where the amendment would further its
purpose, a three-fourths vote by the state legislature is required.156
Substantive changes must be submitted to voters through legislatively
referred state statute, while changes that are in line with the initiative’s
purpose can be approved without voter approval, albeit with the
substantial three-fourths majority.157 A three-fourths majority is also
required to appropriate or transfer funds that were designated by the
initiative in question; any appropriation of funds must further the
purposes of the initiative.158 Unlike an alternative proposal, the VPA did
not prohibit the state legislature from using emergency legislation to
enact changes to an approved initiative.159
California, notorious for its use of initiatives and referenda, affords
its legislators even less power to amend enacted initiatives.160 The
legislature may only repeal or amend initiatives with the electorate’s
approval if the initiative in question expressly stipulates an alternate
means by which the statute might be amended.161 California courts

fourths of the members of each house of the legislature, by a roll call of ayes and nays,
vote to amend such measure.”); see also Arizona Sec’y of State, 1998 General Election
Ballot Measures, Proposition 105 Analysis by legislative Council 47,
https://apps.azsos.gov/election/1998/Info/PubPamphlet/prop105.html.
153 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(B); Arizona Sec’y of State, 1998 General Election
Ballot Measures, Proposition 105 Analysis by legislative Council 47,
https://apps.azsos.gov/election/1998/Info/PubPamphlet/prop105.html.
154 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(A).
155 Id. at § 1(6)(C); see also Hauser, supra note 150, at 586 n.129.
156 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C).
157 Id. at § 1(6)(D).
158 Id.
159 Arizona Sec’y of State, 1998 General Election Ballot Measures, Proposition 104
Analysis by Legislative Council 37, https://apps.azsos.gov/election/1998/Info/Pub
Pamphlet/prop104.html. In Arizona, emergency legislation, which includes “laws
immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or for
the support and maintenance of the departments of the state government and state
institutions,” requires a two-thirds vote in each house of the state legislature as well as
the Governor’s signature and is not subject to referendum, where voters could
otherwise directly overturn the legislation by popular vote. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1,
§ 1(3).
160 In California, “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.” CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
Legislative power is vested in the state legislature, “but the people reserve to themselves
the powers of initiative and referendum.” CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
161 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal a referendum
statute. The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute
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liberally construe the people’s power of initiative,162 assuming a duty to
“jealously guard the precious initiative power, and to resolve any
reasonable doubts in favor of its exercise.”163 In California, courts
presume that the legislature acted lawfully and within its authority and
uphold legislative acts that amend an enacted initiative “if, by any
reasonable construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the
purposes of [the initiative.]”164 “This power is absolute and includes the
power to enable legislative amendment subject to conditions attached
by the voters.”165 On its own, the state legislature lacks the power to
amend initiatives.166 Californians have regularly used this process to
sidestep traditional legislative processes and pass (sometimes
contradictory)167 initiatives that may not be amended without the
people’s consent.168
Unlike South Dakota and Idaho, where the legislatures acted
reasonably quickly to repeal laws that they found undesirable,
California tried—and failed—in 2016 to amend a law passed by
initiative nearly thirty years earlier. 1988 Proposition 73 (Prop. 73)
amended the Political Reform Act of 1974 to prohibit public funding of
political campaigns.169 Prop. 73 limited gifts to elected officials,170
that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute
permits amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.”).
162 Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281, 1283 (Cal. 1978).
163 Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Cal. 1991) (internal citations omitted).
164 Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1120 (Cal. 1995).
165 California Common Cause v. Fair Political Practices Com., 269 Cal. Rptr. 873, 876
(Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis omitted).
166 People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 211 (Cal. 2010).
167 1988 California Primary Election Ballot. Ballot Pamphlet, Primary Elec. (June 7,
1988), p. 14, 34 [hereinafter 1988 Cal. Primary Voter Information Guide]. Both
Proposition 73 and Proposition 68 though contradictory in nature, were simultaneously
approved by California voters. In Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political
Practices Comm’n., 799 P.2d 1220, 1221 (Cal. 1990), the California Supreme Court held
that “when two or more measures are competing initiatives, either because they are
expressly offered as ‘all-or-nothing’ alternatives or because each creates a
comprehensive regulatory scheme related to the same subject, . . . only the provisions of
the measure receiving the highest number of affirmative votes will be enforced.”
168 See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative
statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors
unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without the electors’
approval.”); Kelly, 222 P.3d at 211 (“[T]he legislature is powerless to act on its own to
amend an initiative statute.”); Amwest, 906 P.2d at 1122 (rejecting argument that
initiatives may be amended to say “what the voters thought it meant”).
169 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Newsom, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct. App.
2019)
170 Id. at 109 (citing Ballot Pamphlet, Primary Elec. (June 7, 1988), analysis of Prop.
73 by Legis. Analyst, p. 33).
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“proposed establishing limits of campaign contributions for all
candidates for state and local elective office, and prohibiting the use of
public funds for campaign expenditures and newsletters and mass
mailings.”171 “Most important of all” was the restriction of public
financing of campaigns, which aimed to keep tax dollars out of
politicians’ hands.172
Despite extensive litigation,173 Prop. 73’s
restrictions on the use of public funds remained in effect through 2016
when legislators attempted to amend the provision to allow public
campaign funding.174 Unlike South Dakota and Idaho, this is an instance
where the will of the voters withstood legislative efforts to undo the
restrictions placed on California’s electoral system by initiative because
of the unique restraints that California places on legislative alteration of
ballot initiatives, in contrast to the twenty-three other states that allow
ballot initiatives.
Prop. 73 itself provides two methods in the text of the initiative for
amendment or repeal. The law may be amended “by a statute to ‘further
its purposes’ passed in each house by two-thirds vote . . . and signed by
the Governor[,]”175 or “by a statute that becomes effective only when
approved by the electors.”176 In September 2016, Governor Jerry Brown
signed Senate Bill 1107 (S.B. 1107), which repealed Prop. 73’s
prohibition on accepting public funds to seek office.177 S.B. 1107 was
challenged on the basis that it was an “improper legislative amendment
of a voter initiative.”178 For the California legislature to amend Prop. 73
without voter approval, it must pass the amending bill with two-thirds
of each house, and the amendment must reasonably “further[] the
purposes of the Act.”179 In Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn v. Newsom, the
California Supreme Court held that S.B. 1107 did not further the
171

1988 Cal. Primary Voter Information Guide, supra note 167, at 32.
Id. at 34.
173 See Service Emp. Int’l. v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n., 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that Prop. 73’s contribution limits, among other provisions, were
unconstitutional); Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n., 863 P.2d 694, 700 (Cal.
1993) (holding that Prop. 73’s ban on publicly funded mass mailings was severable from
the measure’s unconstitutional provisions, and thus still in effect).
174 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85300(b) (2016).
175 Howard Jarvis, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 109 (citing CAL. GOV. CODE § 81012(a)).
176 Id. (internal citations omitted).
177 Id. at 108
178 Id. at 108.
179 Id. at 113–14 (citing Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Cal.
1995)). This standard is popular among California initiative amendment clauses. See,
e.g., Official Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 5,
at 145. Other California initiatives have used different language, such as “expand the
scope” of the initiative. See Cty. of San Diego v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 240 Cal. Rptr.
3d 52, 64 (Cal. 2018).
172
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purposes of Prop. 73, but controverted the Proposition’s purposes by
eliminating the ban on public campaign financing that was at the core of
the initiative.180 Historical context, ballot arguments in favor of the
initiative, and express statements of purpose in the act can each serve
as evidence of an initiative’s purpose, as can the initiative’s plain text.181
California courts have invalidated amendments for contravening a law’s
principal purpose where the amendments took substantially different
policy approaches from the law being amended.182 S.B. 1107 was invalid
because it was not amended in one of the two ways that Prop. 73
expressly allows.183 The bill took a “significantly different policy
approach” to campaign reform than did the Political Reform Act, and so
was invalid because it conflicted with a primary mandate of the law.184
This process of judicial review demonstrates one way in which
states can safeguard the will of voters with respect to electoral reforms.
Even thirty years later, voters’ expressed desire that their tax dollars not
go toward political campaigns constrained how the state legislature
could govern. The mere fact that voters can reliably bring suit to
challenge amendments made to laws passed by initiative demonstrates
another key benefit to this type of check on legislative power. As Julian
Eule has argued, courts must play a larger role in resolving questions
that arise in the course of direct democracy, “not because direct
democracy is unconstitutional, nor because it frequently produces
legislation that we may find substantively displeasing or short-sighted,
but because the judiciary stands alone in guarding against the evils
incident to transient, impassioned majorities that the Constitution seeks
to dissipate.”185

180

Howard Jarvis, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118.
Id. at 114–15 (citing Amwest, 906 P.2d at 1120).
182 Gardner v. Schwarzenegger, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 239 (Ct. App. 2009). The court
emphasized that the amendment must further the purposes of the Political Reform Act
of 1973 as a whole, not merely the amendments made through Prop. 73. Howard Jarvis,
252 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 115.
183 Id. at 117.
184 Id. at 118.
185 Eule, supra note 11, at 1525 (arguing that courts, as the de facto adjudicator of
initiatives, should exercise a lesser degree of judicial restraint in so adjudicating).
181
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V. IMPLEMENTING MEANS-ORIENTED AMENDMENTS TO PROTECT VOTING AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS
Based on the above discussion, this Comment proposes that states,
and specifically voters who reside in states with substantial initiative
powers, should seek to amend their respective constitutions to institute
procedural and substantive constraints on their legislatures’ power to
amend and repeal initiated statutes governing voting and electoral
reforms. This Part first examines the benefits and drawbacks of
allowing for a substantive component such as the “further the purpose”
standard. This Part also addresses implementation challenges in states
that have initiated constitutional amendment procedures and those that
do not.
This Comment takes no position on precisely which combination of
procedural constraints each state should adopt; voters should
determine for themselves the level of protection they desire against
legislative interference in electoral schemes. Differently constructed
procedural schemes can have diverse benefits. Adopting, for example,
time constraints alone would allow the electorate a set amount of time
to elect new representatives under their proposed electoral regime
before legislators could repeal or amend those new rules at will. This
could serve as a trial period for new laws while still allowing voters
substantially greater power to determine how they elect their
respective legislators.
In contrast, adopting supermajority
requirements would (perhaps indefinitely) require broad consensus
among legislators to reverse or alter changes made by the electorate
directly, but would still grant elected representatives some degree of
freedom to revisit those laws.
The question of voter approval presents notable benefits alongside
troubling challenges. Voter approval requirements, with or without
accompanying substantive qualifications on those requirements,
strengthen voters’ effective veto power over their representatives.
These requirements serve as a direct check on legislators’ own
incentives to promote policies that facilitate their remaining in office.186
At the same time, legislatures are less able to make incremental
adjustments to electoral regimes in the face of changing circumstances.
Voter approval requirements for voting and electoral laws would pose
less proximate harm to good governance in the short- and medium-run
than would imposing similar constraints in more rapidly changing areas
of governance, such as taxation schemes, spending programs, and the
like. Whereas governments may suddenly be faced with new areas that
186

See discussion supra Part IV.
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require funding, the types of demographic shifts that necessitate
electoral reform happen more slowly. Indeed, the federal Constitution
requires a federal census for redistricting only every ten years.187
Particularly where the threshold for voter approval is lower than for
legislative amendment, such restrictions may also cause special interest
groups to send repetitive, confusing, or contradictory initiatives to the
public for a vote. California has struggled with this issue, with courts
having to conclude that where contradictory initiatives are
simultaneously approved, only the initiative receiving the highest
number of votes goes into effect.188 To limit the complications that come
with strict voter approval, states may be best served by allowing
legislatures some degree of freedom to amend legislation based on
substantive criteria or where the body can meet a sufficiently high
threshold of support.
Crucially, any proposed amendment in this vein should exempt
electoral and voting initiatives from being subject to legislative
emergency powers.
Perceived unconstitutionality or policy
disagreements should not be hidden under a veil of legislative
emergency to exempt changes to state electoral systems from being
maintained by voters as they exist. As Kristen L. Fraser has argued,
“[n]otwithstanding criticism from advocates of referendum rights,” no
legal violation arises where a legislature justifies application of the
emergency clause based on the vague criteria set forth in their state
constitution.189 Some states regularly employ such clauses to effectively
abrogate the People’s power of referendum, or their ability to vote on
an act of the legislature.190 South Dakota and Idaho both resorted to this
tactic to undermine initiated laws and amendments that affected
legislators’ ability to maintain power.191 South Dakota voters were
unable to muster the votes to enshrine the repealed campaign finance
and ethics provisions into its state constitution via initiative.192 It was
187

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Pl. Practices Com., 799 P.2d 1220,
1221 (Cal. 1990).
189 Kristin L. Fraser, Grasping for the “Elephant in the Courthouse”: Developments in
Washington’s Law of Law-Making, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 490 (2008).
190 Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Governing by Initiative: Structuring the Ballot
Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 65 n.76 (1995)
(discussing how Colorado has used the emergency clause invoking the public safety
exception to prevent any referendums by citizen petition).
191 H.B. 1069, 2017 Leg., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017) (codified as Campaign Finance Repeal
and Revise, 2017 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 72 §§ 1–2 185); In re Writ of Mandamus And/Or for
Writ of Prohibition, 92 P.3d 1063, 1064 (Idaho 2002).
192 Trevor Mitchell & Shelly Conlon, Voters Reject Tobacco Tax Hike, Support Limiting
Out-of-State Money for Ballot Initiatives, ARGUS LEADER (NOV. 7, 2018), https://www.argus
188
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precisely these legislative emergency powers that kept Idaho voters
from obtaining redress in state court.193 While there should be some
meaningful check on an insulated initiative power, legislatures have
abused their emergency powers, and will continue to, in order to
dispose of voter-made law that they dislike.194 Constitutionally
speaking, there is less harm done to voters if the laws are left on the
books and challenged in the courts.
Including a substantive constraint like the “furthers the purpose”
standard on the legislature allows for flexibility while promoting an
active role for the courts in this context. Allowing legislatures to amend
and revise such initiatives—with broad consensus—is one way to
ensure that initiated electoral reforms are clear, concrete, and
enforceable. Courts would provide voters recourse, estopping any
attempt to undermine the initiated laws. To determine voters’
reasonable interpretations of the core purpose of the initiative—rather
than just the stated purpose of the initiatives’ framers and court
advocates195—California courts, for example, look at historical context,
ballot arguments in favor of the initiative, express statements of
purpose in the Act, and the initiative as a whole to determine voter
intent.196 California’s ballot pamphlets and advertising materials are
readily available online.197 In considering the purpose of an initiative,
Arizona courts similarly consider “statements of findings passed with
the measure as well as other materials in the Secretary of State’s
publicity pamphlet available to all voters before a general election.”198
In both states, the materials that courts consider in determining voter
intent are limited to those available to voters when they voted on the
initiative. Courts should also be more open to evidence of mass media
representations of an initiative’s meaning, as the electorate is
disproportionately influenced by these materials relative to the more
traditional materials that California and Arizona courts take into
account.199
leader.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/07/south-dakota-election-results-threefive-ballot-measures-fail/1891328002.
193 See In re Writ, 92 P.3d at 1068.
194 See, e.g., Collins & Oesterle, supra note 190, at 65 n.76.
195 See Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1296 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (arguing that
oral arguments made by the initiative’s proponents in court as to its purposes were not
dispositive).
196 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Newsom, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 114 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2019) (citing Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1120 (Cal. 1995)).
197 California Ballot Measures, U.C. HASTINGS LAW LIBRARY, https://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/ballot-measures/resources-and-historical-information.
198 Ariz. Early Childhood Dev. & Health Bd. v. Brewer, 212 P.3d 805, 809 (Ariz. 2009).
199 See Schacter, supra note 92, at 111.
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Finally, as the events in Florida demonstrate, means-seeking
amendments should have language that constrains not only the
legislature but also the courts in how they might interpret voting and
electoral reforms. Means-seeking amendments should attempt to
ensure that courts avoid unanticipated consequences of ballot
initiatives that voters may not have reasonably intended. As Staszewski
has argued:
[C]ourts should . . . narrowly construe ambiguous ballot
measures when the potential collateral consequences of a
proposal were not readily apparent to voters, and the
substantive merits of a particular course of action were
therefore not subject to reasoned deliberation, particularly
when the interests or perspectives of the individuals or
groups who would be adversely affected by a proposed
understanding of the law were not considered during the
lawmaking process.200
By coupling the “furthers the purpose” standard with a broad
presumption in favor of voter intent, courts would be less likely to
interpret electoral initiatives in a way that results in unintended
consequences, as occurred in Florida. This presumption should apply
with extra force where the underlying intent of an initiative was to
expand the franchise or constrain legislative behavior. Such an
approach would prevent results analogous to the Florida Supreme
Court’s Advisory Opinion on Amendment 4, which narrowly construed
an extremely broad term in the state constitution.201
In states that allow initiated constitutional amendments, the
adoption process for this kind of constitutional amendment is
straightforward. Voters may sidestep the legislature and directly
amend their constitutions just as they would pass a normal initiative,
albeit with a higher threshold for approval.202 In states that allow
initiated state statutes but not constitutional amendments—Idaho is
one example—citizens face a heavier lift to convince their legislators to
cede control over electoral and voting laws to the people. Perhaps a
more effective strategy in these states would be to first advocate for the
adoption of constitutional amendment by initiative, which would create
200

Staszewski, supra note 93, at 1174.
Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting
Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020).
202 Of the states that allow for initiated state statutes, only five do not allow initiated
constitutional amendments: Idaho, Maine, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Initiative
and
Referendum
States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiativestates.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
201
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the process by which the people could enact these changes. Finally, in
states that allow for constitutional amendment by initiative but not
initiated statutes, voters need only grant themselves the power of
legislation-by-initiative alongside the protections discussed here.203
One unavoidable critique of this proposal is the potential for abuse
of this insulated initiative power to abuse minority rights and further
disenfranchisement. While electoral and voting laws are, in most cases,
subject to the whim of self-interested legislators, legislators can also
serve as a safety valve against attempts by a majority of voters to limit
minority rights. Poor and minority communities are already likely to be
underrepresented in the legislature, but new and increasing barriers to
accessing the ballot box create unique problems when it comes to
governing through initiative.204 Voter ID laws, partisan redistricting,
felon disenfranchisement, and a systematic elimination of polling sites
create barriers for entire communities to participate in the electoral
process, including by facilitating underrepresentation in their
respective state legislatures.205 If those whose rights are being limited
have less access to the ballot in the first place, initiatives will only
further undermine their electoral standing. More easily than Florida
voters amended their state constitution to restore felon voting rights,
other states without felon disenfranchisement laws could enact statutes
by initiative that effectively strip thousands, if not millions, of people of
the right to vote. These risks should not be taken lightly. Subjecting
legislative amendment or repeal of such laws to voter approval could
facilitate a literal tyranny of the majority, denying voting rights to some
portion of the electorate based solely on the desires of a voting majority.

203 In some states, this may require two separate constitutional amendments because
of Single Subject laws, which limit the focus of constitutional amendments by initiative
to one subject. For a discussion on the Single Subject rule, see Rachel Downey, Michelle
Hargrove & Vanessa Locklin, Direct Democracy: A Survey of the Single Subject Rule as
Applied to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579 (2004).
204 Eule, supra note 11, at 1515.
205 Feldman v. Reagan, 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016) (Thomas, C.J., dissenting)
(“Minority voters encountered significant burdens in exercising their right to vote. The
reduced number of polling places meant that voters had to wait hours in line to cast
ballots.”); Anthony J. Gaughan, Has the South Changed? Shelby County and the Expansion
of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 109 (2013); Voter Identification
Requirements | Voter ID Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2020),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx; Christopher
Ingram, Thousands of Polling Places were Closed Over the Past Decade. Here’s Where.,
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/
26/thousands-polling-places-were-closed-over-past-decade-heres-where.
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Despite these risks, citizens rarely enact initiatives that expressly
discriminate against protected minorities, but more frequently block
government efforts to assist minorities.206 In this vein, one study shows
that initiatives have historically been used for “reform” purposes, 87%
of which have been “inclusive” rather than “exclusive.”207 Another study
comparing legislation passed through direct democracy as compared
with representative democracy showed that while states with more
robust direct democracy regimes did, in fact, enact anti-minority
proposals at a higher rate than did state without direct democracy, the
overall passage rate was relatively modest.208
Redistricting initiatives in the 20th century were sometimes used to
establish more equally apportioned legislative districts than the
legislators themselves had drawn.209 In 2000, Arizona voters approved
an initiative that created an independent legislative redistricting
commission that takes legislative apportionment out of the hands of
both voters and their legislators.210 Because the independent
commission is subject to the VPA, it has an additional level of
independence that stems from the high threshold for amendments to its
enabling.
The legislature is required to make “necessary
appropriations” for the independent commission’s operation but may
“submit nonbinding recommendations” for how districts should be
drawn.211 For any proposed legislation that seeks to undermine the
independent commission’s core purposes, the Arizona legislature must
turn to the voters.
When the people act on their own to create electoral and voting
reforms, the potential for misbehavior and trampling on minority rights
is admittedly greater. The “furthers the purpose” standard does not
offer much substantive protection against anti-minority policies and
indeed may serve to insulate anti-majority policies against correction by
elected representatives. But the “furthers the purpose” standard, in
conjunction with a legislative override provision, would give wellmeaning legislators the ability to check the electorate’s anti-minority
206

KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 142–44 (2009).
RICHARD BRAUNSTEIN, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM VOTING: GOVERNING THROUGH DIRECT
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 65–69 (2004)
208 Daniel C. Lewis, Bypassing the Representational Filter? Minority Rights Policies
Under Direct Democracy Democratic Institutions in the U.S. States, 11 ST. POL. POL’Y Q. 198,
209 (2011). The study found that direct democracy states enacted 20% of anti-minority
proposals, compared with 10% in representative democracy states. Id. at 204–05.
209 MILLER, supra note 206, at 151–52.
210 Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2661
(2015).
211 Id.
207
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proposals. This problem is not, however, limited to or a result of the
remedy proposed in this Comment. Instead, anti-minority proposals
that garner sufficient support within the electorate may be sustained
even in the face of the most aggressive legislative nullification.
In states that allow for both initiated statutes and constitutional
amendments, a majority that feels as though its legislature has
unreasonably undermined its anti-minority wishes can attempt to
enshrine those same policies in the state constitution.212 Indeed, this
dynamic was on display as South Dakota voters voted on Constitutional
Amendment W in response to the legislature’s repeal of Measure 22.213
Though Constitutional Amendment W was ultimately rejected,214 its
presence on the ballot illustrates the steps that voters will take to push
back against nullifying legislators. Particularly on high-profile issues
like voting rights, it may be that legislative nullification or alteration to
protect minority rights, ultimately, undermines those rights by causing
backlash and instigating a constitutional amendment to subvert those
rights, as occurred in South Dakota. In this way, legislative nullification
does not serve as an effective roadblock for anti-minority policies where
voters are vested with the initiative power. This proposal does not solve
the anti-minority problems that are inherent in direct democracy.
Instead, it attempts to reshape direct democracy so that, while antiminority concerns sustain, initiatives can be one tool for minority
groups, alongside a coalition of sympathetic voters, to establish more
robust protections for their political rights.
Legislative nullification is being used to roll back progressive
reforms that expand the franchise, create stricter ethics and campaign
finance laws, and otherwise reform states’ voting and electoral systems.
The ballot initiative, with proper protection, can be a powerful tool to
wrest control over states’ governance schemes and enshrine
protections for underrepresented groups to ensure free and fair
elections well into the future. While there is certainly potential for
misuse of the initiative power, curtailing legislatures’ abilities to amend
or nullify popularly enacted legislation creates a path for citizens to
push back against attempts to subvert the popular will. By amending
212 For example, in 1996, California voters amended the state constitution through
Proposition 209 to prohibit government affirmative action programs in public
employment, education, and contracting, to the extent that the programs gave
preferential treatment based on “race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.” CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31.
213 See discussion supra Section II.A.
214 South
Dakota
Election
Results,
N.Y. TIMES
(May
15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-southdakota-elections.html.
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their constitutions to protect voting and electoral reforms enacted
through initiative, voters can take back influence that relaxed campaign
finance regulations and increasing partisan divides have appropriated
from them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Today’s political landscape has created numerous obstacles for
voters to freely choose their elected officials. Legislative alteration or
nullification of voter-approved initiatives that change how legislators
are elected only serves to further erode the power of a person’s vote.
When legislators can further entrench themselves in power by
undermining the intent of the electorate, faith in our representative
democracy erodes. While empowering initiatives poses new and
daunting challenges, this moment in history necessitates structural
changes that offer a powerful check on political elites. When voters
decide to expand the franchise, politicians should not be able to have the
final say. When voters impose term limits, legislators should not merely
be able to set them aside and remain in their jobs indefinitely. This
Comment has proposed one remedy for this dilemma that, particularly
in states with initiated constitutional amendments, requires only the
will of the electorate to implement. States that allow the electorate to
enact voting and electoral reforms through ballot initiatives to expand
access to the franchise, strengthen ethics and campaign finance rules,
and limit their legislators in other ways should protect those reforms by
enacting procedural and substantive constraints on their legislature
that prevent representatives from nullifying the express will of their
constituents. Such structural reforms have the potential, even when
posed as mere threats, to change legislative behavior to better
accommodate the desires of the electorate. If only for that purpose, the
proposal made here provides voters with a powerful tool in the toolbox
to assert themselves in the face of legislative efforts to limit the
franchise, lower the ethical bar, or otherwise misbehave.
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APPENDIX
Table 1 - Electoral and Voting Reform Initiatives, 2000-2019215
Arizona
2000
2004

Establish appointed Redistricting Commission to redraw boundaries for legislative
districts
STATUTE: Prop 200: Would require proof of U.S. citizenship in order to vote

California
2000

Prop 39: Authorizes local school bond issues for certain uses if approved by 55%

2008

STATUTE: Prop 11: Independent commission to draw legislative district boundaries

2012

Prop 28: Limit of 8 years (senate)/6 years (assembly) replaced with 12-year limit
on combined service
STATUTE Prop 73: Limits on Campaign donations

2016

Prop 54: Conditions under which legislative bills can be passed
Colorado
2004
2006
2008
2016

Initiative 27: Reduces contribution amount to candidates and various political
organizations
Initiative 41: Prohibits elected officials or their immediate family members from
accepting gifts
Initiative 54: Closes a remaining loophole in CO election law by banning the practice
of “Pay to Play”
STATUTE: Prop 107: Open presidential primary elections
STATUTE: Prop 108: Unaffiliated electors voting in primaries
Amendment 71: Distribution and supermajority requirements for initiatives

Florida
2010

2018

Amendment 5: Amends current practice of drawing legislative district boundaries
Amendment 6: Amends current practice of drawing congressional
district boundaries
Amendment 4: Restores right to vote for most people with prior felony convictions
upon completion of their sentences

Michigan
2018

Proposal 2: Creates independent citizens redistricting commission
Proposal 3: Voting Policies in State Constitution Initiative (Straight-ticket voting;
automatic voter registration; same-day registration)

Missouri
2016

Amendment 2: Regulations on campaign contributions

2018

Amendment 1: Addresses lobbying, campaign finance, and redistricting procedures

215 The table below includes any initiatives enacted between 2000 and 2019 that
addressed voting and electoral reform. I included in this definition any initiatives
involving campaign finance, election procedures, expansion or contraction of the
franchise, redistricting, term limits, and restrictions on legislators’ conduct. These
initiatives were compiled from Ballotpedia’s database of state ballot initiatives, which
are catalogued by state and then by year. This chart does not include all states that allow
initiatives in some form, but merely the states that enacted initiatives that fit these
categories. See List of Ballot Measures by State, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
List_of_ballot_measures_by_state.
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Montana
2006
2012

STATUTE: I-153: Prevents state officials and their staff from becoming
licensed lobbyists
STATUTE: I-166: Set policy on prohibiting corporate contributions
and expenditures in Montana elections

Nebraska
2004

Measure 415: Limits legislators to no more than two consecutive terms

Measure 418: Requires 2/3 majority of state legislature to modify
initiatives approved by voters
North Dakota
2018

Measure 1: Establishes an ethics commission, bans foreign political
contributions, and enacts provisions related to lobbying and conflicts of interest
Measure 2: Citizen Requirement for Voting Amendment Initiative

Oregon
2006

STATUTE: Measure 47: Puts restrictions on campaign contributions

South Dakota
2016

STATUTE: Measure 22: Revise campaign finance and lobbying laws

Washington
2004

STATUTE Initiative 872: Establishes top-two primary for state elections

